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 Probabilistic Causality and Multiple Causation
 Paul Humphreys
 The University of Virginia
 I shall argue in this paper that although much attention has been
 paid to causal chains and common causes within the literature on proba-
 bilistic causality, a primary virtue of that approach is its ability to
 deal with cases of multiple causation. In doing so I shall try to
 indicate some ways in which contemporary sine qua non analyses of causa-
 tion are too narrow (and ways in which probabilistic causality is not)
 and refine an argument by Reichenbach designed to provide a basis for
 the asymmetry of causation.
 1. The Scope of Probabilistic Causation
 In his contribution to this symposium (Salmon 1981) Professor
 Salmon has emphasized the central role played by processes and inter-
 actions in causality. Whereas his discussion of common causes
 naturally has a futuristic orientation using causal fans of the type
 given in Fig. 1. ,
 A1 A2..... An_l An E
 C A1 A...... An_, An
 Fig. 1 Fig. 2
 I shall be rather more backwards-looking and concentrate on the advan-
 tages that probabilistic causation possesses for the analysis of multi-
 ple causes of the type2 in Fig. 2.
 Appropriately, history supports such an orientation. In the early
 PSA 1980, Volume 2, pp. 25-37
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 years of the twentieth century statistics was, to a considerable body
 of practitioners, the study of multiple causation. George Udny Yule
 in his classic textbook of 19113 provided this illuminating defini-
 tion: "The theory of statistics is the exposition of methods specially
 adapted to the elucidation of quantitative data affected by a multi-
 plicity of causes." (Yule 1911, p.5). Supporting this claim was a care-
 ful exposition of measures of association which, stripped of its
 archaic notation, is closely related to the early part of Suppes' 1970
 monograph (Suppes 1970). That causal tradition in statistics later
 became overshadowed by the theory of statistical inference, but it has
 been picked up by those earliest users of statistics, the sociologists.
 In the course of this evolution, the methods shifted from probabilistic
 theories of causality to theories of probabilistic causality, as
 statistical methods of data analysis gave way to probabilistic models
 incorporating the causal processes which connect the relevant variables.
 This reorientation, which has been noticed in the philosophical litera-
 ture by Deborah Rosen (Rosen 1980) is typified by this quotation from
 Otis Dudley Duncan's book on structural equation techniques: "Here we
 distinguish sharply between (1) statistical description, involving
 summary measures of the joint distribution of observed variables ... .and
 (2) statistical methods applied to the problem of estimating coeffii-
 cients in a structural model . .one cannot even get started on the
 latter task without a firm grasp of the relevant scientific theory,
 because the starting point is, precisely, the model and not the statis-
 tical methods." (Duncan 1975, pp. 5-6). Noting first that Duncan is
 following standard sociological practice in using "model" to refer
 to an (interpreted) theory, the emphasis on theories illustrated by the
 quotation is, I believe, vitally important because of the fact that the
 use of probabilistic causality (as distinct from the statistical
 analyses mentioned earlier) seems to commit us to indeterminism. We
 must not lose sight of the fact that scientific causal claims are, for
 the most part, made not about the phenomena themselves, but models of
 it (where "model" is now used in the standard philosophical way or, as
 I would prefer, in some more robust Campbellian sense, in which
 structural relations and processes are certainly not obviously set-
 theoretic entities). Most philosophical theories of causation, in the
 course of being justified by appeal to commonplace examples, tacitly
 rely on this too, for it surfaces in their standard assumption of
 determinism. The concepts of determinism and indeterminism can be
 made rigorous only by recourse to deterministic theories and models,
 and indeed determinism is plausible only if we do, even implicitly,
 refer our claims to these models, for the vast weight of everyday
 experience is against determinism. (Indeterminism, of course, is an
 extremely weak hypothesis, it needing but a single process to go awry
 for indeterminism to hold.) Yet as soon as we revert to models
 representing even moderately sophisticated phenomena, they turn out to
 be indeterministic. I take as my reference point here the wide use of
 causal theories in the sociological, economic, and biological litera-
 ture where, despite a methodological commitment to determinism, the
 models themselves are actually indeterministic without their ad hoc
 "error terms".4 It is not just that an enormous gain in simplicity is
 thereby achieved by moving to these abstract models (for example, in
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 the five variable case alone, there are over one thousand possible
 causal models) but that as Duncan stresses in the above quotation, in
 non-experimental contexts we should never know where to begin without
 the model. The point is that were we to rule out such claims made on
 the basis of indeterministic models as genuinely causal, we should have
 to reject almost all causal claims that we make. The comnon use of
 such models also provides a reason for abandoning the emphasis on
 causal chains which is so prevalent in the philosophical literature on
 causation. Chains are simply a limiting case of the general situation
 of multiple causation. Thus, whereas Salmon wishes to reject causal
 chains because of their reliance on a basic event ontology (Salmon 1981,
 Section 8), I should place at least as much emphasis on the inability
 of the chain approach to adequately represent situations involving
 multiple causal influences. As Cartwright (1979) has observed, the
 consequences of such multiple influences are not always simply the com-
 bined results of the individual effects, and the use of non-linear
 "interactive terms" included in structural equations, for example,
 recognizes that.
 No claim is being made here for such causal models being ontologi-
 cally fundamental of course, and I have specifically avoided references
 to models of quantum mechanical phenomena. The additional difficulties
 imposed by the indistinguishability of many elementary particles and
 the problems associated with locality require separate analysis. It is
 also important, I believe, to make it clear when we are doing meta-
 physics and when philosophy of science. The present section of this
 paper falls squarely into the latter category.
 We can do more than merely appeal to causal usage in science, how-
 ever, when comparing probabilistic causality with alternative accounts.
 Probabilistic causality can be counted as a species of causation by
 virtue of satisfying a basic principle of causality - the principle of
 relevant difference. This principle asserts that for something to be a
 cause of an effect, it must make some difference to that effect. By
 insisting on a strict criterion of event identity, this can be put as:
 the presence of a cause must make some difference, within the circum-
 stances, to whether the effect occurs or not, as compared to the cause's
 absence. This is obviously not a sufficient condition for something to
 be a cause (it allows self-causation and omits a criterion of causal
 direction) but it lies at the heart of many causal analyses. In
 particular, it is recognized by sine qua non accounts: "The intuitive
 idea behind [the counterfactual analysis] is fairly simple. To say that
 the event c is the cause of the event e is to say that the occurrence
 of event e depended in some way on the occurrence of event c." (Swain
 1978, p. 1) (The author is actually discussing a theory of causation
 which insists that a cause be necessary for the effect. Counterfactual
 accounts of causation can be wider than that, though sine qua non and
 counterfactual approaches are usually identified. I shall avoid that
 identification and use the sine qua non terminology.) Application of
 the principle of relevant difference supports our doubts about over-
 determining causes as cases of proper causation, and along with these
 doubts, the rejection of the simple sufficiency view of causation. The
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 manipulability account also appears to satisfy the principle.
 Because causal theories which insist that a cause must be necessary
 in the circumstances for the effect have enjoyed wide use, and moreover
 seem to have the ability to include indeterministic causal sequences, I
 shall devote the remainder of this section to illustrating their
 inability to provide correct answers (or any answers at all) in many
 cases of multiple causation. Necessary conditions are simply a special
 case of probabilistic causes, for if A is necessary for E, then A
 raises the probability of E, and hence is a contributing cause when
 there is a process connecting the two. Not all contributing causes are
 necessary, as we shall see, and sine qua non accounts are also incom-
 plete in failing to include counteracting causes (in the sense used
 here). In what follows, I shall restrict the discussion to situations
 involving contributing causes.
 The two central features of the theory of probabilistic causality
 adopted here are that (1) a cause changes the probability of the
 effect and (2) a completed process connects cause and effect.5 It is
 clear that (1) satisfies the principle of relevant difference - con-
 tributing causes by making the effect more probable and counteracting
 causes by making it less probable. Equally important is the fact that
 probabilistic causes can satisfy this principle even in cases of
 multiple causation. Consider the situations diagrammed below, where a
 set of background conditions F is assumed to hold in all three cases.
 Fig. 3a is here to represent the situation where A individually, or B
 individually, is capable of producing E, even though they are not
 sufficient f or E. Because when both A and B occur, with completed
 processes running between A and E, and between B and E, A is prima
 facie not necessary in the circumstances for E, and neither is B, and so
 such a situation is as potentially difficult to incorporate into a sine
 qua non analysis as is the much discussed overdetermination case
 diagrammed in Fig. 3b.
 E E E
 A B A B A B
 Fig. 3a Fig. 3b Fig. 3c.
 Cases of the kind sketched in Fig. 3a frequently occur. For example,
 we may apply both heat and incident light to a metal so that the
 phenomena of thermionic and photoelectric emission are both operating.
 Neither the heat nor the light source is necessary in the circumstances
 for the common effect of an electron emission when it occurs (nor
 indeed is either sufficient). From the social sciences, a second
 example occurs when an individual 's economic level and degree of formal
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 education supplement one another to cause a favorable attitude towards
 them from a second individual. A third example familiar from everyday
 experience is that of a car whose weak spark and faulty carburetion
 could each be responsible for the car's failure to start. Again,
 neither is necessary for the common effect when both are present. In
 such cases, as long as the condition P(E/ABF)> P(E/ABF) is satisfied,
 A will count as a contributing cause of E, even given the presence of
 B, and the same holds, mutatis mutandis, for B. Although I am firmly
 convinced, both on the grounds of common usage and satisfaction of con-
 ditions (1) and (2) that it is correct to call A a cause of B in such a
 situation as occurs in Fig. 3a, I shall not use this type of example to
 argue the merits of probabilistic causality, for most sine qua non
 analyses do not cover this type of case. By either explicitly (e.g.,
 Lewis 1973, p. 559) restricting themselves to deterministic situations,
 or, more commonly, by simply discussing deterministic cases exclusively,
 cases of the kind represented by Fig. 3a have not been raised in the
 literature, the focus rather being on overdetermination situations of
 the type given in Fig. 3b. (One notable exception here is Mackie (1974),
 whose theory I discuss below.)
 Before leaving this example, I must emphasize that the superficial
 similarity to overdetermination cases should not mislead us into think-
 ing that the present case suffers from the difficulties of that much
 discussed6 situation of Fig. 3b. The fact that a completed process
 connects cause with effect does not mean that invariably the probability
 of the effect steadily increases until, right before it occurs, it has
 the value one. This does indeed hold for some processes, but to believe
 it true in general is to fall prey to a "chicken counter's fallacy" in
 which an incorrect image of the causal process heading towards the
 effect's fixed point of occurrence plays a large role. The (conditional)
 probability of the effect can easily decrease as can be seen by con-
 sidering a process in which E becomes progressively more probable, yet
 E eventually occurs. The (conditional) probability of the effect can
 also stay constant across time. Thus an indeterministic effect can be
 uncertain right up to the point at which it actually occurs, and so is
 not overdetermined, even when multiple causal influences are present.
 I should also point out that whereas genuine cases of overdetermination
 are rare (overdetermining causes usually alter the effect while supple-
 mentary causes, for example, can simply increase the chance of the
 effect without materially altering it) the examples that I listed above
 for the indeterministic case are not. Many other examples could be
 cited.
 To more sharply see the difference between an account which insists
 on a cause being necessary for the effect and the present approach, con-
 sider now a situation like that of Fig. 3c. Here A, B occur simultan-
 eously, P(E/ABF)> P(E/ABF) but now no completed process connects B with
 E. B is insufficient in the circumstances for E, although it could by
 itself produce E on occasion. I shall consider the case where A is aIso
 insufficient, although the argument holds when P(E/AF)= 1. Finally, E
 is not allowed to occur spontaneously. Now, of course the specific
 answer given by a sine qua non analysis for this case will depend upon
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 the particular semantics for counterfactuals used. Because Mackie's
 account has explicitly included indeterministic situations under its
 scope, I shall, for concreteness, discuss that theory here. I
 believe, however, that this type of case provides serious difficulties
 for all existing sine qua non theories.
 Whereas there might be residual doubts that A is actually a cause of
 E in situation 3a, there surely can be no question that A is a cause
 (perhaps even the cause) of E in situation 3c and that B was not. Yet
 Mackie's analysis leads to the claim that A was not a cause of E in
 circumstances 3c. His counterfactual analysis (1974, Ch. 2, especially
 pp. 33, 52; although see also the caveat about processes on p. 86)
 requires that for A to be a cause of E the counterfactual "If A had not
 occurred, then in the circumstances, E would not have occurred" must be
 true. We test for the truth of that sentence by considering a situa-
 tion which is exactly similar up to the point at which A occurs, then
 removing A and replacing it with some "neutral" event. Then we let the
 world run on according to the prevailing laws. If we can then assert
 that E would not occur in that counterfactual situation, A was a cause
 of E in the original situation. In the case at hand, removing A will
 not result in the removal of B, because B occurs simultaneously with A,
 and the world remains the same up to the point at which A occurs.
 Furthermore B, although not sufficient for E, might, when we let the
 world run on without A, lead to E in the counterfactual situation. The
 presence of a completed process between B and E in the substitute
 situation and the absence of a process between the neutral substituting
 event and E are allowed by the fact that the world runs on in an inde-
 terministic fashion. Hence we certainly cannot assert that in the
 counterfactual situation, E would not occur. So, under Mackie's theory,
 A was not a cause of E. But if not, what was? In contrast, probabilis-
 tic causality allows that because A raised the probability of E, and
 was connected to it by a completed process, A was a cause of E, and
 that, I think, is correct.
 There is one special case of "multiple causation" which deserves
 attention because it affects even isolated causal chains, and that is
 the case I excluded in the above example, where an event can occur
 spontaneously. Spontaneity is a particularly puzzling form of
 aleatory activity because there appears to be nothing which we can
 ultimately identify as a cause of the spontaneously produced event
 other than a non-zero chance of its occurrence. Actual examples of
 this type of situation, where an event can occur either spontaneously
 or after being induced by some physical stimulus, are a liquid being
 placed in a freezer, where it also has an infinitesimally small chance
 of freezing spontaneously; and a laser beam, where there is a
 practically negligible probability of coherent light being emitted
 spontaneously rather than by stimulated emission. We can, of course,
 provide detailed descriptions of the physical structures underlying
 such phenomena, but that simply pushes the spontaneity to a deeper
 level. Such spontaneous occurrences can be ruled out as caused under
 probabilistic causality. The reason is simply that there is no con-
 trast situation available with which to compare the effect of the ever-
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 present spontaneity. Even modern treatments of 'spontaneous' occurren-
 ces which tend to attribute what was formerly spontaneous to an in-
 eradicable residual field (as for example the treatment of spontaneous
 emission of radiation in Sakurai (1973) does) appear to suffer from the
 same lack of a contrast case in that it is physically impossible to
 eliminate the zero-point field. When the inducing event and process
 are present as well as the spontaneity, probabilistic causation will
 allow the inducing event as a cause, as it does with the ordinary
 multiple causation cases discussed above. But again, sine a non
 theories will be hard pressed to allow the inducing event as a cause.
 The examples just given adequately illustrate, I think, the incorrect-
 ness of denying that such events are causes.
 2. The Asymmetry of Multiple Causation
 In section 19 of The Direction of Time (Reichenbach 1956), Reichen-
 bach claimed that the properties of certain types of causal forks
 allowed a (local) direction of macroscopic causation to be determined.
 As it stands, the argument is unsatisfying, because it relies on our
 having previously decided on the basis of microscopic considerations
 that explanations by final causes are not possible. Nevertheless, the
 basic idea that we may arrive at a causal asymmetry through multiple
 causes and effects rather than single sequences is striking. I shall
 provide here a more detailed argument for causal asymmetry which avoids
 the appeal to explanations.
 Reichenbachts argument can be easily presented. Comimnon causes often
 satisfy the conditions for a conjunctive fork:
 (i) P(AB/C) = P(A/C) .P(B/C)
 (ii) P(AB/C) = P(A/C) . P(B/C)
 (iii) P(A/C)> P(A/C)
 -7
 (iv) P(B/C)>P(B/C)
 Reichenbach claimed that (i) through (iv) are not logically sufficient
 conditions for a fork to be a common cause for, he asserted (1956,
 pp. 161-2) it was logically possible for common effects to satisfy the
 statistical relations as well. Yet, he went on to argue, as a matter
 of fact, common effects only satisfy the definition of a conjunctive
 fork when preceded by a common cause. The reason for this is that con-
 ditions (i) through (iv) jointly entail that P(A/B)> P(A/B) . This
 statistical association needs to be explained, and only a common cause
 can do that. Common effects cannot explain the association between
 their causes, for that would constitute an explanation by a final cause.
 Hence, he concluded, whenever we came across a fork which is open on
 one side as in Fig. 3a, and which satisfied the definition of a con-
 junctive fork, we could infer that it was an instance of a common cause,
 and hence the direction of causation was away from the node. There are
 two grounds on which this argument could be faulted. As mentioned above,
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 we need an auxiliary argument to substantiate the claim that effects
 cannot explain their causes, and one which does not presuppose a
 direction of causation. Equally troubling is the lack of an independent
 specification of what is to count as a common effect. Two cases are
 important here. In the first case, referring to Fig. 3a again, as in
 the discussion of Section 1 both A individually, and B individually,
 can lead to E. Alternatively, it could be the case that neither A nor
 B is individually capable of producing E, but together they can. In
 this second case, we should allow that A was probabilistically
 necessary for E in the circumstances, and so was B. Reichenbach was
 never explicit about which of these cases he intended by "comnon
 effects", but his examples all appear to be of the second kind. (See,
 for examples, Reichenbach 1956, p. 157). This is not surprising, for
 cases in which both A and B are necessary for E trivially satisfy
 clauses (i), (iii), and (iv) of the definition of a conjunctive fork
 because when both A and B are necessary ancestors of E, P(AB/E) = 1 =
 = 8 P(A/E) = P(B/E). Hence if we are to find cases of common effects
 which are not conjunctive forks, we must either focus on clause (ii) or
 look at cases where neither cause is necessary for the effect. I shall
 do the latter. Because such cases are commonly encountered (see the
 examples given in Section 1 above) our causal analysis of the world
 would be seriously incomplete were we to omit consideration of them. So






 Here we have a fork ADB whose causal direction is unknown., For it to
 be a conjunctive fork, the condition
 (i) P(AB/D) = P(A/D) . P(B/D)
 has to be satisfied. Now suppose that in the situation at hand,
 (II) P(A.B/D) = 0.
 If the situation is a common effect, so that A and B causally precede D,
 condition (II) says that A, B are the only events capable of producing
 D. In many situations, this condition will be satisified.
 Also suppose that
 (III) P(A/D)< 1 and P(B/D)< 1.
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 Again, if the situation is one of a common effect, this means that
 neither A nor B is individually necessary for D. Hence when both (II)
 and (III) hold and the direction of causation is from A to D and from
 B to D, we have a common effect whose antecedents exhaust all possible
 causes of the effect, yet whose joint presence precludes either from
 being individually necessary for that effect. Can condition(i) be
 satisfied by such a common effect? Suppose it were. Then by the
 algebraic properties of probabilistic independence, (i) and (II) give
 0 = P(A.B/D) = P(A/D) P(B/D),
 and hence either
 P (A/D) = 0 or P((B/D) = 0,
 violating (III). So when (,II) and (III) are satisfied by a common
 effect, that effect cannot be a conjunctive fork.
 Of course, (i), (-II) and (III) are inconsistent in the case of
 common causes too. But whereas there are cases of common effects where
 (II) and (III) are satisfied, and hence (Ci) violated, when we have
 common causes it is (II) that will often be false in indeterministic
 situations. When D causally precedes A and B, (III) simply says that
 D is insufficient for A and for B. Thus D can be followed by both A
 and B making (II) false unless there is some interaction between A and
 B precluding their joint occurrence. If not, then (II) will be false
 and (i) can be satisfied.
 These considerations show that when a fork satisfies (II) and (III)
 above, it i s either a common effect or an interactive common cause. To
 decide which is the case, we must leave logic and turn to the kinds of
 considerations outlined by Salmon in section 7 of his paper (Salmon
 1981) - the claim that interactive common causes can be distinguished
 from other kinds of common causes by the nature of the laws governing
 them. Although we have here an argument for a local causal asymmetry
 only, the discussion indicates that, contrary to Reichenbach's claim,
 some types of common effects cannot be conjunctive forks whether pre-
 ceded by common causes or not. Furthermore, if Salmon's contentions
 about interactive common causes are correct, the appeal to fundamental
 physical laws could be made without necessarily retreating to micro-
 statistical considerations. As long as there are fundamental physical
 laws governing macroscopic phenomena which are not supervenient upon
 microscopic laws, a purely macroscopic account of the direction of
 causation could be given.
 By way of a final remark, the argument given by van Fraassen in
 (1977) which claims to show that the demand for common causes rules
 out indeterministic theories can be reconstructed in terms of our
 three conditions (i), (II) and (III). He considers a situation where
 an event C is invariably followed by one of the three incompatible
 events A,B,D. Letting 0 be (A or D) and $ be (B or D), he finds that
 C, although a complete specification of the state of the system, does
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 not satisfy P(0.QJ/C) = P(0/C) . P(Q/C) . One might point to the fact
 that 0 and @ co-occur only when D occurs as one of the reasons why 0
 and $ are not conditionally independent on C. A more interesting point
 is that 0, if , and C satisfy our condition (II) (with 0 replacing A, i{
 replacing B, and C replacing D) and hence if we were to insist on
 condition (i) being satisfied, as Reichenbach's principle of the common
 cause does (see, Reichenbach 1956, section 19), we should have to
 reject (III), i.e., require that P(0/C) = 1 or P($/C) = 1. C would thus
 have to determine at least one of those events. That of course would
 not give complete determinism, particularly since 0 and $ are disjunc-
 tions of elementary events. The obvious way out of the dilemma, how-
 ever, is simply to note that C is still a common cause of 0 and Q , but
 that retaining (II) and (III) requires accepting OC$ as an inter-
 active fork, rather than a conjunctive fork.
 3. Summary
 I have merely been able to scratch the surface of probabilistic
 causality here. Some questions which I have left untouched are the use
 of probabilistic causality in decision making; the connection that
 positive causal relevance has to functional causation and explained
 variance techniques of statistics; and how the process approach works
 when something is caused by a process not going to completion - as when
 my car stops because the electricity shorts out, cutting off current to
 the distributor. I am optimistic that all these have answers which are
 not too far away from the basic ideas of contributing and counteracting
 causes. Probabilistic explanation is perhaps the area which stands to
 benefit most from a correct theory of probabilistic causality, and I
 believe that the successes already achieved in that area are proof
 enough of the value of this approach. For a treatment of explanation
 using the ideas underlying this paper, see Humphreys (1981) and, for a
 rather different approach, Salmon (1978),
 Probabilistic causality thus satisfies three important criteria. The
 claims that it makes are consistent with causal claims made by well-
 entrenched scientific theories in ways that existing alternatives are
 not. It is based upon a principle which, in different ways, motivates
 other generally accepted causal theories. And it is philosophically
 fruitful in providing plausible answers to a number of traditional
 problems associated with causation.
 One moral can be drawn from this paper, and that is how the hygienic
 models of the physical sciences have unduly influenced causal discus-
 sion, so that multiple causation has been relegated to a secondary
 position. This area might, perhaps, be one where the methodology of
 the social sciences can finally make a distinctive contribution.
 Notes
 1This paper is a revised version of one presented as part of a
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 symposium on probabilistic causality. The other symposiasts were Nancy
 Cartwright and Wesley Salmon. The original paper was read in my absence
 by James Fetzer.
 2From now on, I shall discuss only the case n=2. All arguments can
 be extended to the general case by obvious methods.
 3This work,, later co-authored with M.G. Kendall, is one of the
 longest-lived statistics texts ever, running to the same fourteen
 editions as Fisher's "Statistical Methods" over a period of seventy
 years.
 4A clear statement of the correct use of these models can be found in
 Blalock (1962), pp 183-184. Further representative remarks on this
 subject can be found in Simon (1953), pp. 49-52.
 5For a fuller discussion of the theory used here see section II of
 Humphreys (1980).
 6See, e.g., Lewis (1973), Loeb (1974), Swain (1978), Goosens (1979).
 7Following Reichenbach, all probabilities in this section are to be
 interpreted as relative frequencies. By applying these to the single
 case, this will avoid the difficulty faced by conditional propensities -
 that they already contain a causal direction - and allow us to freely
 use inverse probabilities.
 8Most of Reichenbach's examples of common causes are also of this
 limiting kind. See also Salmon's discussion of perfect forks in
 Salmon (1981).
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